Append-Only Backups: The Only Ransomware Defense That Survives Compromised Credentials
backups the attacker can't delete the number that matters here
By Stan K.
Ransomware doesn't just encrypt your files — it encrypts your backups, using the credentials you gave your backup client. Borg and Restic both ship an append-only mode that accepts new backups and refuses deletions. Our paranoid setup, explained.
The standard backup fantasy: ransomware hits, you wipe, you restore, you’re a hero. The standard ransomware reality: the attacker sat in your network for three weeks, watched where backups go, and encrypted the backup target with the same credentials your backup client uses — often before the visible attack, so every restore point is already poisoned.
The defense is a property, not a product: append-only backup storage — a destination that accepts new backups forever and refuses deletions and overwrites, no matter what credentials are presented.
The two tools that ship it
Borg: borg serve --append-only. On the backup server, the daemon is started in append-only mode: clients can create archives and nothing else. Deletes, prunes and rewrites are rejected until an administrator flips the mode off interactively. The documented trade-off: the repo grows until a human decides to prune — which is the correct default, because “automatic pruning” is exactly the capability you don’t want an attacker to inherit.
Restic: rest-server --append-only. Restic’s official rest-server has the same flag with the same semantics: backups append, deletions bounce. On top of that, restic’s repo format v2 (0.14+) adds zstd compression, backups take non-exclusive locks so many machines write safely to one repo, and it preserves the Unix metadata a full system restore needs (SUID/SGID bits and friends).
Kopia — GUI-friendly, fast, our recommendation for desktop users in the Backups hub — has no built-in append-only mode; its ransomware story relies on provider-side immutability (Object Lock on B2/e2). That’s workable, but it’s a different trust chain: you’re trusting the storage API policy rather than your own server’s flag.
An immutable storage bucket (Object Lock) and an append-only backup server are two different guarantees, and some backup tools have neither. Ask the concrete question: “if my backup client’s credentials are stolen, can yesterday’s archives be deleted?” If the answer isn’t a flat no, you don’t have the property.
The setup we run
The shape, in one paragraph: data backs up via restic to object storage at $6.95/TB (B2, with egress free up to 3× stored volume — restores are just bandwidth), the rest-server fronting it runs --append-only, and Object Lock provides a second, independent lock on the same data. Two independent mechanisms, one target: the attacker would need to defeat the append-only flag and the bucket’s immutability window and the object-storage API’s compliance mode. rclone (MIT, v1.76) handles the transport layer everywhere else.
Why restic over Borg for our shape: Borg is superb at compression (zstd/lzma) but its remote story is SSH-only — the server must run Borg, repos lock repository-wide during writes, and multi-client concurrency is restic’s model, not Borg’s. Borg with Vorta as the GUI remains the right answer for Linux-to-Linux SSH setups and single-admin machines. Both are BSD-licensed, both are boring in the best way, and Borg2 — currently in beta with an explicit “do not use for production” warning from its own developers — is worth waiting on, not running.
The restore drill nobody does
Append-only protection is a hypothesis until you test the failure: pick a machine, delete something real, restore it from last night’s archive, and time it. The drill surfaces the things that rot silently: SSH keys that expired, the bucket policy that got “simplified,” the 500 GB packaging cap you forgot, the bandwidth math that says a full restore takes four days. A backup you’ve never restored is a superstition, not a system.
Where this fits
- The money side of restores — drive deposits, ZIP caps, the 3× egress rule — is What One Lost File Really Costs
- The consumer-plan side — what $99/year products quietly exclude — is The $99 Backup Plans
- The inventory side — free backups you already have — is Backups You Already Have
- Tool-by-tool licenses, versions and defenses: the Backups hub open-source table